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 Abstract 
Decision under ambiguity (uncertainty with unknown probabilities) has been attracting 
attention in behavioral and neuroeconomics. However, recent neuroimaging studies 
have mainly focused on gain domains while little attention has been paid to the 
magnitudes of outcomes. In this study, we examined the effects of the sign (i.e. gain and 
loss) and magnitude of outcomes on ambiguity aversion and the additivity of subjective 
probabilities in Ellsberg's urn problem. We observed that (i) ambiguity aversion was 
observed in both signs, and (ii) subadditivity of subjective probability was not observed 
in negative outcomes. 
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1. Introduction 
Decision under uncertainty with known probabilities has been extensively studied in 
both behavioral and neuro- economics. For instance, recent neuroimaging studies have 
shown that one’s parameter in Prelec's probability weighting function is associated with 
neural activation in the anterior cingulated cortex (Paulus et al., 2006), and 
Kahneman-Tversky's framing effects in decision under probabilistic uncertainty across 
gain-loss domains have been found to be negatively related to the orbitofrontal activities 
(De Martino et al., 2006). We have also examined the neurochemical modulation of 
probabilistic choice (Ohmura et al., 2005), and the role of information-theoretic 
uncertainty in probabilistic choice (Takahashi et al., 2007). Moreover, several studies 
have examined decision under uncertainty with unknown probability (ambiguity) 
(Camerer & Weber, 1992). For instance, McCabe's group performed a PET (positron 
emission tomography) study across gain-loss domains (Smith et al., 2002), Camerer's 
group has demonstrated that ventromedial-amygdala circuits are neural circuitry of 
general uncertainty evaluation (Hsu et al., 2005), and Huetell's group has reported that 
risk and ambiguity preferences may be represented in the posterior parietal cortex and 
lateral prefrontal cortex, respectively (Huettel et al., 2006).  
However, to date, no study has systematically examined the effects of sign and 
magnitude of outcomes in a large sample population. In this study, we examined the 
roles of sign and magnitude in decision under ambiguity in terms of ambiguity aversion 
and the additivity of subjective probability of ambiguous outcomes, by utilizing 
Ellsberg's urn problem with different magnitudes and signs of outcomes (large, medium, 
and small gain and loss) in university students. Because the effects of sign and 
magnitude have been extensively studied in intertemporal and probabilistic choice 
(Estle et al., 2006; Frederick et al., 2002), our present study may also help elucidate 
distinct psychological processes for decision-making under ambiguity and risk, and over 
time. 
 
2. Methods 
 
A total of 122 university students participated in the present study. In order to examine 
subjects’ attitudes towards ambiguity and risk, the Ellsberg's urn problem with 
hypothetical outcomes was employed. It should be noted that employing real monetary 
payoffs is difficult for studies on decision-making in loss domains. Subjects were 
instructed in the following manner (the example of the small gain condition is presented 
in detail). It is to be noted that ¥1000 (JPY) is approximately equivalent to US $10. 
 [Imagine that an urn contains 90 balls: 30 are red; of the rest, some are blue and some 
are green. One ball is to be drawn at random form the urn.  
 
First question: 
You are asked to choose between the following options: 
Option A. Receive ¥1,000 if the ball is red. 
Option B. Receive ¥1,000 if the ball is blue. 
 
Second question: 
You are asked to choose between the following options: 
Option C. Receive ¥1,000 if the ball is red or green. 
Option D. Receive ¥1,000 if the ball is blue or green.] 
 
In the negative outcome tasks, we replaced "receive" with "lose" in order to examine 
subjects' attitudes towards ambiguity in loss domains. To examine the effect of 
magnitudes of outcomes, three different sizes (i.e., ¥1,000, ¥10,000, ¥100,000) of gains 
and losses were presented (i.e. a total of six conditions were examined). It is important 
to note that (i) if a subject prefers option A (risk) over option B (ambiguity), s/he is 
ambiguity aversive, and (ii) if a subject prefers option A over option B and, 
simultaneously, prefers option D over option C, subjective probabilities estimated by the 
subject for possible ambiguous outcomes are subadditive (Camerer & Weber, 1992). 
Therefore, according to these two criteria, we examined subjects' ambiguity aversion 
and additivity of subjective probability in small, medium, and large gains and losses. In 
order to examine whether subjective probabilities are subadditive or not, we utilized 
McNemar tests for within-individual comparisons of choices between risk (option A and 
option D) and ambiguity (option B and option C). Significance levels were set at 0.05 
throughout. 
 
3. Results 
 
[Figure 1 inserted here] 
 
 Ambiguity aversion 
We first analyzed subjects' choices for the first question, in order to examine 
whether or not subjects were ambiguity aversive in each sign and magnitude. Across all 
signs and magnitudes, most subjects chose risky options (option A, options under 
uncertainty with known probabilities), rather than ambiguous options (option B, options 
under uncertainty with unknown probabilities). This indicates that subjects were 
ambiguity aversive in loss domains as well as gain domains. The proportion of subjects 
choosing risky options did not significantly differ across signs and magnitudes of 
outcomes. 
 
        [Table 1 and 2 inserted here] 
 
 Subadditivity of subjective probability 
Next, we analyzed the additivity of subjective probability of ambiguous outcomes. It 
should be noted that if subjective probabilities of ambiguous outcomes are subadditive, 
subjects will choose option A and option D in the gain domains, but will choose option 
B and option C in loss domains. The proportion of subjects' choices in gain and loss are 
presented in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. As we can see, subjective probabilities for 
ambiguous gains were subadditive (p<0.001, for all gains); while subjective 
probabilities for ambiguous losses were not subadditive, indicating that subjects might 
estimate probability of ambiguous loss in a non-subadditive (additive or superadditive) 
manner. Moreover, for medium loss, subjects' choices were inconsistent in terms of 
ambiguity aversion, in that they more markedly chose the ambiguous option in the 
second question, while significantly avoiding ambiguity to a great extent in the first 
question (Table 2B). 
 
4. Discussion 
This study systematically examined the effects of magnitudes and signs of outcomes 
on decisions under ambiguity. We observed that (i) subjects are ambiguity aversive in 
both gains and losses across all magnitudes, and (ii) subjective probabilities of 
ambiguous outcomes are subadditive in gains but not subadditive in losses. 
 
4.1 Magnitude effects in decision under uncertainty 
With a few exceptions (Estle et al., 2006; Ohmura et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2002), 
previous studies on intertemporal and probabilistic choices, mostly focusing on gain 
domains have reported that people discount delayed large gains less steeply than small 
gains; while large unlikely gains are more strongly devaluated than small unlikely gains 
(Frederick et al., 2002; Estle et al., 2006). Our current findings indicate that there is no 
significant magnitude effect in decision-making under ambiguity in terms of choice 
between ambiguous and probabilistic outcomes (relative subjective values between 
outcomes with risk and ambiguity). However, when certain outcomes which are 
subjectively equivalent to ambiguous outcomes are examined, it is possible for 
magnitude effects appear. Furthermore, magnitude effects in loss domains have not been 
extensively studied even in intertemporal and probabilistic choices; these points should 
be examined in future studies. 
 
4.2 Sign effects in decision under uncertainty 
We observed that there was no sign effect on ambiguity aversion in the first question of 
the Ellsberg's urn problem, consistent with previous reports (Inukai & Takahashi., 2006; 
Smith et al., 2002) and in contrast to intertemporal and probabilistic choices. In 
intertemporal choice, it is known that gains are more steeply discounted than losses; 
while in decision under risk, it is well-established that people are risk-aversive in gain 
frames, but risk-seeking in loss frames, which has been associated with the amygdala 
activation by utilizing functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) imaging in a recent 
neuroeconomic study (De Martino et al., 2006). Therefore, future neuroeconomic 
studies may be able to identify distinct neural processes between decision under 
ambiguity, and intertemporal and probabilistic choices. 
 
4.3 Additivity of subjective probability in decision under uncertainty 
Additivity of probability in decision under risk (probabilistic uncertainty) and patience 
in intertemporal choice (i.e. a discount factor) has been extensively studied (Read et al, 
2003). In probabilistic choice, it is well-established that people overestimate small 
probabilities while underestimating large probabilities. The behavioral economist Prelec 
has axiomatically derived the probability weighting function, with which it can be stated 
that large probabilities are subadditive; while small probabilities are superadditive. A 
recent neuroeconomic study demonstrated that distortion of probability weighting is 
negatively associated with the activation of the anterior cingulate cortex; while no 
neuroimaging study has demonstrated the neural correlate of subadditive 
time-discounting (Paulus et al., 2006). Regarding the neural processing underlying 
ambiguity aversion, Camerer's group has shown that in gain domains ambiguity is 
associated with stronger activation of cortico-limbic circuitry for general uncertainty 
rather than risk. Future studies utilizing PET/fMRI should examine whether or not 
different degrees of neural activation in the cortico-limbic neural circuits are apparent. 
This point may help to understand the mediating effect of neural processes in "choice 
bracketing" (Read et al., 1999) in decisions under ambiguity. In the current study, it was 
observed that, for medium loss, subjects' choices were inconsistent in terms of 
ambiguity aversion. Future neuroimaging studies are needed to elucidate the neural 
processing behind inconsistent attitudes toward ambiguity in loss domains. 
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Table 1A Ellsberg's urn problem with small gain 
 
Each cell indicates the proportion of choices made by subjects. McNemar test revealed 
that subjective probability for ambiguous small gain was subadditive, i.e., subjects 
significantly prefer risky over ambiguous gains in both questions (

=16.7, p<0.001). 
 
+¥1,000 Second question 
C:Ambiguity  
(red and green) 
D: Risk  
(blue and green) 
First 
question 
A: Risk  
(red) 
16.7% 53.3*% 
B: Ambiguity 
(blue) 
11.7% 18.3% 
  
  
Each cell indicates the proportion of choices made by subjects. 
McNemar test revealed that subjective probability for ambiguous small gain was 
subadditive, i.e., subjects significantly prefer risky over ambiguous gains in both 
questions (

=14.4, p<0.001). 
+¥10,000 Second question 
C:Ambiguity  
(red and green) 
D:Risk  
(blue and green) 
First 
question 
A: Risk  
(red) 
18.3% 53.3*% 
B:Ambiguity 
(blue) 
13.3% 15.0% 
Table 1B Ellsberg's urn problem with medium gain 
 
Table 1C Ellsberg's urn problem with large gain 
 
Each cell indicates the proportion of choices made by subjects. 
McNemar test revealed that subjective probability for ambiguous small gain was 
subadditive, i.e., subjects significantly prefer risky over ambiguous gains in both 
questions (

=18.7, p<0.001). 
+¥100,000 Second question 
C: Ambiguity  
(red and green) 
D: Risk  
(blue and green) 
First 
question 
A: Risk  
(red) 
21.3% 54.1*% 
B: Ambiguity 
(blue) 
9.8% 13.1% 
Table 2A Ellsberg's urn problem with small loss 
Each cell indicates the proportion of choices made by subjects. 
McNemar test revealed that subjective probability for ambiguous small loss was not 
subadditive, i.e., subjects did not consistently avoid risky losses, in comparison to 
ambiguous losses, in both questions (

=0.8, p=0.37). 
¥1,000 Second question 
C: Ambiguity  
(red and green) 
D: Risk  
(blue and green) 
First 
question 
A: Risk  
(red) 
35.0% 30.0% 
B: Ambiguity 
(blue) 
21.7% 13.3% 
 Table 2B Ellsberg's urn problem with medium loss 
 
Each cell indicates the proportion of choices made by subjects. 
McNemar test revealed that subjects significantly avoided ambiguous than risky losses 
in the first one-color question but avoided risky losses more strongly in the second 
two-color question (

=6.26, p=0.01<0.05), indicating that their attitude towards 
ambiguity was significantly inconsistent. Anyway, it can be said that subjective 
probability for ambiguous medium loss was not subadditive, i.e., proportion of cell (2,1) 
= 11.1 was not significantly larger than other proportions. 
 
 
  
¥10,000 Second question 
C: Ambiguity 
 (red and green) 
D: Risk  
(blue and green) 
First 
question 
A: Risk  
(red) 
43.3*% 33.3% 
B: Ambiguity 
(blue) 
11.7% 11.7% 
 Each cell indicates the proportion of choices made by subjects. 
McNemar test revealed that subjective probability for ambiguous large loss was not 
subadditive, i.e., subjects did not consistently avoid risky losses, in comparison to 
ambiguous losses, in both questions (

=3.24, p=0.072). 
¥100,000 Second question 
C:Ambiguity 
(red and green) 
D:Risk  
(blue and green) 
First 
question 
A:Risk  
(red) 
43.3% 28.3% 
B:Ambiguity 
(blue) 
13.3% 15.0% 
Table 2C Ellsberg's urn problem with large loss 
 
Figure 1: Ambiguity aversion in the Ellsberg's urn problem in the first question in both 
signs (gain and loss). 
 
 
 
 
Subjects significantly avoided ambiguous options in both gains and losses. 
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